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Pennsylvania's Learnfare Experiment:
Real Welfare Reform or Politics as
Usual?
1. Introduction
The public welfare system in the United States is widely
regarded as a failure.' The costs of administering welfare pro-
grams and the number of individuals dependent on public assis-
tance continue to grow at a record pace.? As a result, reforming
the present welfare system is overwhelmingly advocated.3 Despite
recent attempts, the federal government has been unable to
improve the current structure.4 Therefore, beginning in the early
1980s, states increasingly attempted to experiment with welfare
reforms.5 States are now the dominant force in devising welfare
policy.
One of the most controversial attempts to reform welfare is
Learnfare,6 a program that conditions public assistance welfare
1. See Health Reform's First Victim, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1994, at A12 (describing why
the present welfare system is a moral and fiscal disaster).
2. Ron Suskind and Jackie Calmes, Clinton Scales Back Plans To Overhaul Welfare
Amid Election-Year Politics, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1994, at A14. A record 13.6 million
people (9% of the population) presently receive public assistance. Simultaneously, the cost
of administering the welfare program is growing 10% a year, well in excess of inflation. In
fact, welfare costs now exceed the national defense budget. Id. The federal government has
spent an estimated $5 trillion attempting to fight poverty. John Engler & Spencer Abraham,
No Devil in Devolution, NAT'L REV., Aug. 28, 1995, at 38.
3. An April 1995 New York Times/CBS poll revealed that 95% of the population
favors a fundamental change or a complete overhaul of the welfare system, while only 3%
favor minor changes. See A Golden Opportunity for the Democrats, WASH. TIMES, July 17,
1995, at A21.
4. See Joanna K. Weinberg, The Dilemma of Welfare Reform: "Workfare" Programs
and Poor Women, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 415 (1991) (examining failed attempts to reform
the welfare system).
5. See Lucy Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform
Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719 (1992) (outlining recent state efforts).
6. "Learnfare" is the standard term to describe programs that condition welfare
payments on regular school attendance. While some states refer to the program by different
titles, (Pennsylvania, for example, calls its Learnfare program the "Student Attendance
Improvement Project") "Learnfare" will be used throughout this Comment for consistency.
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payments on a child's habitual school attendance.7 The program
utilizes monetary penalties to induce students to regularly attend
school.8 Learnfare strives to increase the number of children
receiving Aid for Families with Dependant Children (AFDC)9 who
obtain a high school education in order to reduce the likelihood
that they will remain dependent on welfare.1"
Several states have enacted Learnfare experiments with
varying degrees of success." In June 1994, Pennsylvania became
the most recent state to amend its welfare system and passed
legislation that contained a Learnfare program. To implement the
reform, however, Pennsylvania was required to petition the federal
government for permission to alter the current welfare system. 2
Pennsylvania's waiver application is presently being evaluated by
the federal government.13 Permission to enact the reform will be
granted if the federal government determines that the experimental
program innovatively improves the AFDC program and will likely
enhance the life prospects of the state's AFDC recipients.
14
This Comment considers the effectiveness of Pennsylvania's
Learnfare experiment. Improving the attendance habits of
impoverished students is a laudable objective. The experiment,
however, fails to consider the complex historical, structural,
economic, and cultural dynamics of poverty that affect poor
families. Pennsylvania's Learnfare experiment is not an innovative
approach to reforming welfare. Rather, it essentially duplicates the
unsuccessful aspects of Wisconsin's Learnfare program. Moreover,
Pennsylvania's approach undermines the paramount goal of welfare
7. The general components of Learnfare are discussed in Williams, supra note 5, at
726-36.
8. Id.
9. AFDC is the most typical form of public assistance. The program provides the basic
federal need-based income transfer for dependent children and their caretaker relatives. The
program is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-87 (1988).
10. See Williams, supra note 5, at 726.
11. See Pennsylvania § ll5 Waiver Application for the School Attendance Improvement
Program Demonstration Project (Sept. 1994), at iv [hereinafter Pennsylvania Waiver
Application] (summarizing the results of each state's Learnfare program) (on file with the
Dickinson Law Review).
12. See infra notes 53-64 and accompanying text for an explanation of the waiver
process.
13. See infra notes 130-66 and accompanying text (discussing Pennsylvania's Learnfare
program and the pending waiver application).
14. See Pennsylvania Waiver Application, supra note 11, at 9-13 (explaining how the
project intends to improve the current AFDC program).
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reform - to strengthen families. As a result, this Comment
ultimately concludes that Pennsylvania's Learnfare program will not
provide a positive solution to the failing welfare system.
Part II of this Comment provides a historical overview of the
public welfare system in the United States. Part III discusses state-
enacted welfare reforms. Particular emphasis is placed on Wiscon-
sin's Learnfare program, which served as a model for Pennsylva-
nia's plan. Part IV examines recent welfare reforms in Pennsylva-
nia. Part V critically evaluates Pennsylvania's Learnfare experi-
ment. Finally, Part VI concludes that Learnfare will not likely
achieve its goals and, as a result, should not be implemented in
Pennsylvania.
II. The Origins of the Public Welfare System and the Worthy
Person Standard
Historically, public welfare programs in the United States have
not provided all of the nation's needy citizens with public assis-
tance. Instead, the welfare system has conditioned receipt of
assistance on subjective notions of personal worth."5 The Ameri-
can welfare system traditionally has offered assistance only to those
citizens who conform to middle-class values and behavior.16 While
many nations view welfare as a moral obligation of the public to
assist needy citizens, 7 United States policy has long regarded
welfare as immoral and inconsistent with the ideals of the nation.
18
Even the nation's initial welfare programs19 were grounded in
discrimination.'
15. See Weinberg, supra note 4, at 419-23 (exploring the impact of the worthy person
standard on modem welfare policy).
16. See Joel Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependant Children:
The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 457 (1987-
88).
17. See, e.g., Randall Mikkelson, Bell Tolls for "Swedish Model" in Welfare Reform
Proposals, REUTERS, Oct. 28, 1990, at 1 (describing Sweden's "cradle-to-grave" welfare
system and the Scandinavian country's ongoing welfare reforms).
18. For example, a recent survey discovered that nearly two-thirds of those questioned
believe welfare recipients are lazy and nearly 80% believe that recipients choose to live on
welfare. TOM SMITH, ETHNIC IMAGES 9 (National Opinion Research Center, University of
Chicago 1990).
19. See Williams, supra note 5, at 722-23. For many years, public assistance in this
nation was reserved solely for the blind, deaf, and insane. Id.
20. See generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT. THE
POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 267 (1965) (noting that even in the year that the AFDC program
was implemented, President Roosevelt declared that the receipt of public assistance "induces
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Welfare was originally administered by individual states in a
decentralized manner." The onset of the Great Depression,
however, significantly changed the framework of the welfare
system.22 For the first time in the nation's history, masses of
educated white males required public assistance.2 Congress was
consequently pressured by middle-class voters to create a national
framework to support "worthy" citizens.24 The expanded welfare
programs were still rooted in the belief that only certain citizens
are deserving of public assistance.2  As a result, many people
impoverished during the Great Depression were excluded from
receiving welfare benefits.
2 6
The AFDC program developed directly from this original
national framework. Thus, the notion of "personal worthiness" is
inextricably intertwined in present day welfare policies.27 AFDC
originated as a temporary program to provide modest financial
support to children living with widowed mothers who were
previously dependent on their deceased husband for financial
support. 8 The federal government provided monetary assistance
and established broad guidelines for the states to administer the
program. The states were free to devise their own system within
the parameters of the federal framework.29 States often condi-
tioned AFDC payments on the behavioral requirements of the
a spiritual and moral disintegration fundamentally destructive to the nation's fiber").
21. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (describing state's responsibility in
administering welfare).
22. See Handler, supra note 16, at 487-97 (discussing welfare in a historic context).
23. The public's perception of welfare has been integral in shaping national policy. See
David Stoesz, The Urban Crisis: The Kerner Commission for Social Welfare, 71 N.C. L. REV.
1675, 1676 (1993) (linking U.S. welfare policy to localism, capitalism, and racism).
24. Id.
25. Id. In fact, FDR's New Deal welfare programs excluded agricultural and domestic
workers, who were overwhelmingly black, as a concession to appease Southern legislators.
Id.
26. For an insightful look at poverty from the perspective of a welfare recipient deemed
"unworthy" by the middle class, see Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependen-
cy" from a Different Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961 (1993).
27. See Williams, supra note at 5, at 721-25 (tracing the concept of worthiness from the
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widow. 30 As early as the 1960s, states were making great efforts
to induce certain "desirable" behavior from AFDC recipients.
31
While AFDC was originally intended to benefit a narrow class
of citizens, the program's coverage consistently expanded.32  Most
significantly, in 1950, the program was amended to include
payments for poor mothers.3  Soon after, President Lyndon B.
Johnson amended AFDC to permit needy African-Americans to
receive public assistance.34  Due to the lobbying efforts of civil
rights lawyers and welfare advocates, the number of recipients in
the AFDC program doubled in a five-year span.35
The program's focus shifted from "personal worthiness" to
financial need. As a result, the composition of AFDC recipients
changed dramatically. By 1971, only 4.3% of AFDC recipients
were on welfare as a result of the death of their spouse.36 Con-
currently, the operating cost of the program tripled. 37 As the pro-
gram increased in size and expense, the public's attitude began to
change and support dissipated.38
The worthy person concept was the impetus behind the welfare
reforms of the 1980s. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliatory Act39
and the Family Support Act,' arguably the most prominent social
30. Louisiana, for example, denied benefits to a child whose widowed mother gave birth
to an illegitimate child while receiving public assistance. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311
(1962). Alabama denied AFDC benefits to the children of a widowed mother cohabitating
with an able-bodied man. Id. at 322.
31. See Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72
YALE L.J. 1347 (1963) (discussing the common practice in the 1960s of authorities making
unannounced inspections of the homes of persons receiving public assistance to ensure
recipients' eligibility).
32. See Stoesz, supra note 23, at 1676 (tracing the expansion of the AFDC program).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Handler, supra note 16, at 467.
36. Id. (citing DIANA M. DINITTO, SOCIAL WELFARE: POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
130 (1991)).
37. Id.
38. See Stoesz, supra note 23, at 1676 (discussing the perceptions of welfare programs).
39. Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981) (codified as amended at scattered sections of
5 U.S.C.A. to 50 U.S.C.A. (West 1987 & Supp. 1991)). The Act immediately cut or reduced
public assistance benefits to over 700,000 residents and consolidated social programs in order
to save federal and state governments $1.1 billion in 1993. See Stoesz, supra note 23, at 1679.
40. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The federal government promised $6 billion to help states
provide day care, education, and health insurance to move people off welfare and into jobs.
However, only $1 billion was actually appropriated, and cash-strapped states removed
families from the welfare rolls. See Stoesz, supra note 23, at 1684 (discussing the Family
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legislation of the decade, narrowed the class of individuals entitled
to AFDC benefits. The reforms were based on the idea that
despite an individual's poverty, not all citizens merited public
assistance.41
Two dominant themes emerged during the Reagan and Bush
administrations. First, poverty was directly related to behavioral
deficiencies of the poor.42 The public widely believed that welfare
recipients chose to live in poverty.43 As a result, many states went
to great efforts to induce "desirable" behavior." Second, welfare
recipients were distanced from members of the middle and upper
classes in terms of values and work ethic.45 The debate over how
to reform the welfare system shifted from the structural problems
of society to the social deviance of the poor. Welfare recipients
were portrayed as fundamentally different from individuals not
collecting public assistance.' Citizens often stereotyped welfare
recipients incorrectly as African-Americans who lived in inner city
ghettoes, regularly had children to increase welfare payments, and
chose welfare as a way of life.47 Both of these themes exacerbat-
ed the public's discontent and impatience with the welfare system."
Support Act).
41. See Handler, supra note 16, at 465-68 (tracing the connection between the public's
attitude towards the poor and welfare policy).
42. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. S14, 416-17 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990) (noting that poor
behavior is the primary reason families are on welfare).
43. See SMITH, supra note 18.
44. See, e.g., False Assumptions: Welfare Reform Often Misdirected, PHILA. DAILY
NEWS, Feb. 15, 1991, at 41 (noting that lawmakers in Kansas considered offering incentives
to women who volunteer for Norplant contraceptives, and Wyoming legislators considered
offering medical benefits in exchange for poor women placing their babies up for adoption).
45. For example, Former Vice President Dan Quayle blamed welfare for inducing the
riots in Los Angeles after the white police officers who were videotaped beating African-
American Rodney King were acquitted. Michael Wines, White House Links Riots to Welfare,
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1992, at Al.
46. See Williams, supra note 5, at 742-43 (stereotyping the poor as undeserving citizens
who do not want good schools, jobs or safe streets).
47. While "welfare" has become a racial code work to many people, the majority of
public assistance recipients are white. See Barbara Ehrenreich, Welfare: A White Secret,
TIME, Dec. 16, 1991, at 84.
48. Williams, supra note 5, at 740. The public attributed the increasing number of
welfare recipients to the poor's inability to seize the economic opportunities of the 1980s.
Interestingly, however, from 1981-92 the tax burden for the richest 25% of the population
decreased 5.5% while the tax burden for the poorest 25% increased 16.1%. Id.
Simultaneously, the real value of AFDC benefits decreased 43%. Id. Society has grown so
intolerant of the poor that the proportion of philanthropic giving devoted to social welfare
(10%) is now less than the private money given to symphonies. John H. Fund, Welfare:
Putting People First, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1994, at A10.
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III. State Experimentation: The Emergence of Learnfare
Despite the federal government's welfare reforms in the 1980s,
the human infrastructure of the nation deteriorated.4 9 Welfare
rolls climbed at a record pace and reached an all time high.5"
States responded to the federal government's inability to promote
meaningful social legislation and enacted a plethora of statewide
reforms.51 By 1992, states had unprecedented control over the
nation's social agenda. Gun control, abortion, health care, gay
rights, and welfare were all being addressed at the state level.52
This phenomenon continues to intensify and is presently the driving
force behind welfare reform.
A. Federal Waivers: The Existing Model
Public welfare in the United States is now composed of many
distinct programs. Among the most important in Pennsylvania are
General Assistance and AFDC. General Assistance programs are
optional and completely under the auspices of individual states.53
In contrast, AFDC programs are cooperative efforts between the
federal and state governments. 4 The federal government has
established the parameters of the AFDC program in the Social
49. See William Clairborne, Clinton Can Look to the States, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1992,
at A12 (describing the "chaotic" effects of social policies of the 1980s and their effect on the
country a decade later).
50. Presently, 1.5 million Pennsylvanians, approximately 13% of the state's population,
receive some form of welfare. Tim Reeves, Lines Form in Welfare Debate, Prrr. POST-
GAZETTE, May 4, 1993, at B1.
51. See Paul Taylor, Welfare Policy's "New Paternalism" Uses Benefits To Alter
Recipients Behavior, WASH. POST, June 8, 1991, at A3 (detailing the movement of tying the
receipt of public assistance to a change of behavior on the part of the poor).
52. See Michael McQueen, States: Making Government Work, WALL ST. J., July 29,
1988, at Al (outlining the social agenda set by the states).
53. States are not required to administer a General Assistance (GA) program. GA
programs are fully funded and operated by individual states. In fact, only twenty states
provide General assistance benefits. Pennsylvania is one of just ten states nationwide to
offer a full range of benefits (i.e., cash, Medicare assistance, and food stamps) under General
Assistance. Most GA recipients are typically single individuals who have no children and
are ineligible to receive AFDC. See Fact Sheet: Pennsylvania's Welfare Reforms, (Pa.
Department of Public Welfare, Sept. 1994) (on file with the Dickinson Law Review).
54. The federal government provides each state with approximately 55% of the funds
needed to administer the AFDC program. Id. Federal funding for AFDC is currently $15.3
billion per year. See Frank Reeves, Governor Welcomes Welfare Reform, Prrr. POST-
GAZETTE, Apr. 2, 1995, at B1.
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Security Act55 and in Federal Regulations issued by the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services. 6 States may devise their
own directives and procedures provided that the rules do not
conflict with the federally established scheme.5 7 If a state wishes
to enact a provision in its AFDC program that conflicts with the
federal regulations, the state may seek federal approval by
submitting a waiver request to the federal government.5 8 Present-
ly, any individual who meets the eligibility requirements set forth
in the Social Security Act and in federal and state regulations is
entitled to AFDC benefits.
The ability of individual states to circumvent federal regula-
tions was established in 1962.'9 President John F Kennedy
amended the Social Security Act to encourage states to biecome
more imaginative and creative in administering AFDC.' Initially,
the waiver provision was utilized in moderation.6' However, as
states became more active in social legislation, the waiver proce-
dure was increasingly employed.62 In fact, in 1992, President Bush
publicly invited states to request federal waivers to experiment with
their AFDC programs.6  States responded and AFDC-related
experiments increased in number and scope throughout the late
1980s and early 1990s.6
55. 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1988).
56. 45 C.F.R. §§ 201.2-205.2 (1993).
57. Id.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1310 (1988).
59. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, tit. 1, § 122, 76 stat. 172,
192 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1988)).
60. Id. Ironically, while the recent upsurge of waivers has led to decreasing welfare
benefits, President Kennedy intended for the waivers to increase the number of individuals
eligible to receive assistance and increase the amount of benefits. Message from the
President of the United States, Public Welfare program, H.R. Doc. No. 325, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962), reprinted in 108 CONG. REC. 1404, 1405 (1962).
61. See Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and
Welfare "Reform,"26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 741,751-61 (1993) (tracing state experimentation).
62. See, e.g., Michael Wiseman, Welfare Reform in the States: The Bush Legacy, FOCUS,
Spring 1993, at 23-25 (detailing the increase in waiver requests during the Bush administra-
tion).
63. President Bush encouraged the use of federal waivers to reform welfare in his 1992
State of the Union Address. Transcript of Bush's State of the Union Message: "Let's Build
on Our Strengths," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1992 at A17.
64. See Bennett & Sullivan, supra note 61, at 742.
[Vol. 100:1
PENNSYLVANIA'S LEARNFARE EXPERIMENT
B. Block Grants: The Future of Welfare Reform
The welfare reforms likely to emerge from Congress this term
will have a profound impact on the welfare system in Pennsylvania.
The reforms apparently will result in massive funding cuts and the
widespread elimination of federal restrictions on welfare pro-
grams.65 Congress intends to dismantle approximately 70 federal
welfare programs and lump federal funds for those programs into
block grants to be distributed to each of the states.66 In the
process, the AFDC program and the waiver system may be
eliminated. While this reform would give states the ability to enact
Learnfare-type experiments, the block grant approach to welfare
reform makes the decision to implement programs such as
Learnfare extremely critical.
While allowing the states to control the destiny of their own
welfare programs has broad support, many believe that even with
block grants the welfare crisis will not be solved. First, states may
not end up with all the discretion they had hoped.6 7 Many state
governments are concerned that the federal government will
continue to dictate underlying policies.' For example, federal
proposals require that nearly half the welfare recipients participate
in work or training programs. 69  Simultaneously, states may be
required to provide anyone placed in a training or work program
with free access to child care.7°
Congress also wants to cap the amount of the block grants at
1994 levels with no potential increases to meet heightened de-
mand.7 As a result, in real economic terms, states will have
significantly less money with which to experiment. In addition,
proposed changes in the federal eligibility rules for disabled
children receiving Supplemental Security Income may require the
65. See Robert Moran, State Welfare Plan Would Fall in Place if U.S. Law Changes,
PHILA. INQ., Apr. 3, 1995, at B2.
66. Devolution Blues: The States, ECONOMIST, July 22, 1995, at 27 (discussing the




70. See Cheryl Wetzstein, Child-Care Worries Threaten Passage of Welfare Reform,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995, at A4 (discussing the role of mandatory child care in welfare
reform).
71. Id. Under this plan, California, for example, would have received $855 million less
last year than it actually did. Id.
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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
states to cover the $200 million cost of the program. These
reforms place extreme pressure on the states to utilize their limited
financial resources in the most efficient manner possible.
C. Learnfare's Underlying Premises
Learnfare, one of the most controversial attempts at reforming
welfare,73 conditions a family's AFDC payments on a child's
regular school attendance.74 The specifics of each Learnfare
experiment vary from state to state.75 Typically, when AFDC
students do not meet prescribed attendance requirements, their
family's public assistance is reduced or terminated. Connecting
school attendance to welfare payments is an outgrowth of the
notion that only certain individuals are "worthy" of public
assistance.
Nearly 25% of the children in the United States live in
poverty.76  Without a basic education, little chance exists for the
impoverished and uneducated child to escape poverty.77 Individu-
als who lack a high school education earn considerably less money
than high school graduates. 78 As the job market continues to
become increasingly technical, the demand for skilled workers
72. See Frank Reeves, Governor Welcomes Welfare Reforms, Prin. POST-GAZETTE, Apr.
2, 1995, at B1 (summarizing interviews with Governor Ridge and the Secretary of Public
Welfare regarding Congress' proposed welfare reforms).
73. Compare Josie Foehrenbach, Preparing for Learnfare: Setting Conditions for a
Questionable Experiment, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1060 (Feb. 1989) (critiquing Leamfare
for punishing the poor as an antidote for complex social ills) with Give Learnfare a Chance,
L.A. DAILY NEWS, July 14, 1994, at N16 (praising Learnfare for encouraging self-sufficiency
and holding parents accountable for their children's future).
74. See Williams, supra note 5, at 726 (describing the most common components of
Learnfare programs).
75. See Foehrenbach, supra note 73, at 1063-65 (outlining various state approaches to
improving school attendance).
76. Children in Poverty, EDUC. WEEK, Oct. 19, 1994, at 4. In 1993, 15.7 million people
under age 18 lived below the poverty level. This is a disturbing increase of 2.5 million
children since 1989. Id. Poverty is regarded as the single greatest threat to a child's ability
to become a healthy, productive adult. See Patricia Chargot, The State of Poor Children:
"Depressing," DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 26, 1991, at lB.
77. Individuals who become dependent upon welfare before age 22 spend twice the
average length of time on public assistance. Id. For an overview of the relationship between
education and poverty, see generally Lynn A. Stout, Poverty and Failure in the Market for
Children's Human Capital, 81 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1993).
78. The Department of Labor has discovered that high school dropouts have few, if any,
job prospects. Sylvia Nasar, More College Graduates Taking Low-Wage Jobs, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 1992, at D5.
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intensifies.7 9 Simultaneously, the prospects for poorly educated
workers to succeed in the labor market diminishes."0 As a result,
a direct correlation exists between the lack of a high school
education and a chronic dependency on public assistance."1
Therefore, a basic education is essential to function in an increas-
ingly complex society.82
In response to the correlation between education and self-
sufficiency, Learnfare attempts to increase the number of welfare
recipients who complete high school in order to reduce their
dependence on public assistance. The program is premised on the
notion that behavioral shortcomings of the poor have led to the
increasing rate of poverty and educational underachievement of
poor children.83 Specifically, Learnfare assumes that the mother
is at fault when her teenage son or daughter skips school, the
truancy of poor children is caused by the family's lack of support,
and children are motivated by the threat of losing a portion of their
family's welfare benefits.' Ultimately, Learnfare reduces a
family's public assistance in an attempt to induce poor children to
attend school on a daily basis. The idea has broad appeal: AFDC
families whose children are "good citizens" will attend school and
merit public assistance, while those "undeserving" families, who are





82. See Marian Wright Edelman & James D. Weil, Investing in Our Children, 4 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 331, 341 (1986) (noting that employers today generally consider a high
school diploma a minimum prerequisite for employment). The Pennsylvania Legislature has
recognized the decreasing job opportunities available for high school dropouts and has
promulgated legislation to prevent students from dropping out of school. See 24 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6601-06 (1987). The legislation is premised on the notion that because of
their lack of education, dropouts are "unable to participate as productive citizens of the
Commonwealth." Id. at § 6601.
83. See Williams, supra note 5, at 727 (interpreting the underlying assumptions of
Learnfare programs).
84. For an insightful look at the trouble faced by poor children in school, see JONATHAN
KOZAL, SAVAGE INEQUALITY: CHILDREN tN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1993) (describing the
obstacles and conditions faced by students in inner city school systems).
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D. The Wisconsin Experience
Ironically, Learnfare originated in Wisconsin, a state with a
traditionally generous welfare system.85 In 1986, Tommy Thomp-
son was elected governor of Wisconsin due, in large part, to his
campaign pledge to rid Wisconsin of its image as the nation's
welfare magnet. 86 A year later, the Wisconsin Legislature enacted
the nation's first Learnfare program.'
The program requires all teenagers88 to attend school regular-
ly89 or have their family's welfare payments reduced.9" The
program originated with two fundamental goals: first, to ensure
that more teenagers complete high school, thereby acquiring a
minimum level of education to become productive citizens, and
second, to establish a mutual relationship between the state and the
welfare recipient by requiring the recipient to engage in certain
conduct before obtaining public assistance.91
Learnfare and its objectives do not appear controversial.92
Requiring children to attend school and holding parents responsible
for their child's conduct hardly seems questionable.93 However,
the realities of poverty, the difficulties in administration, and the
85. See generally Paul A. Gigot, Potamic Watch- A Republican Who's Unafraid To
Experiment, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1991, at A14 (describing the irony of a conservative-
oriented welfare reform in traditionally liberal Wisconsin).
86. Welfare Cuts in Wisconsin Backfiring, Prrr. PRESS, Dec. 6, 1991, at A8.
87. As a result of Wisconsin's welfare reforms, Governor Thompson has been cited as
one of the nation's top rising conservative politicians. See Dennis Farney, Tommy
Thompson's GOP Star To Rise if He Thrives in Liberal Wisconsin, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24,
1990, at Al.
88. Wisconsin Welfare Reform (Wisconsin Income Maintenance Dept., Feb. 1994) (on
file the Dickinson Law Review). As originally passed in the Wisconsin State Legislature,
Learnfare applied only to teenage parents eligible for the AFDC program. The governor,
however, used his veto authority to expand Learnfare to include all AFDC teenagers. The
program was extended to include children ages six through twelve in four counties. Id.
89. Learnfare students who have three or more full days of unexcused absences are
sanctioned. Id.
90. The average sanction is approximately $130.00 per month. Id.
91. These goals and their empirical assumptions are evaluated in Williams, supra note
5, at 726-27.
92. In fact, in Milwaukee County, where 75% of Learnfare penalties are recorded, 70%
of the residents favored cutting welfare benefits for families whose children skip school.
Dave Taylor, Debating the Lessons of Learnfare, Does Cutting Welfare Reduce Truancy?,
WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1992, at A17.
93. See Frank E. Harper, The Socio-Economic Struggle for Equality. To Kill the
Messenger: The Deflection of Responsibility Through Scapegoating, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER
J. 41 (1991) (describing the increase in the number and scope of parental liability laws).
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expense of operating the program have severely plagued Learn-
fare's effectiveness.
1. Disappointing Results. - Less than one year after the
inaugural Learnfare experiment commenced, a federal judge in
Wisconsin suspended the experiment and declared that "poor
children should not be forced to go hungry in the name of social
experimentation. "' An injunction was issued against the contin-
ued imposition of Learnfare after a welfare recipient charged that
the program unconstitutionally lacked due process mechanisms.
95
The case was eventually settled after the state agreed to implement
an appeals process.96 Following the insertion of procedural safe-
guards, the number of students who were sanctioned decreased five
fold.97 The program, in its revised state, now affords the sanc-
tioned student access to social services.98 In addition, all Learn-
fare students have access to child care facilities and transportation
to school.9 9
Despite these changes, a three-year study conducted at the
state's request by the University of Wisconsin concluded that
Learnfare is not achieving its goals." ° The study found that the
program has been unable to improve either school attendance or
graduation rates."t ' In fact, Learnfare may produce the opposite
results. Nearly half the students sanctioned for missing school
opted to drop out of school altogether."°E In addition, the pro-
gram costs $10.2 million to operate annually.0 3 Most of the
money compensated social workers and administrators as opposed
to assisting the poor."
94. Kronquist v. Goodrich, No. 89-C-1376, slip. op. at 11 (E.D. Wis. July 10, 1990)




98. See Jeannette Mott, States Cannot Force Teens To Learn; Linking Welfare to
Education Has Failed in Other States, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Feb. 6, 1992, at Al.
99. The case management and support services aspects of the program are detailed in
Wisconsin's Welfare Reform, supra note 88, at 3-5.
100. Id.
101. See Wisconsin Experiments with "The 4th American Revolution," STAR TRIBUNE






Governor Thompson complained that the study was biased and
its conclusions inaccurate.15 The State of Wisconsin subsequently
commissioned another review of the Learnfare program. The
three-month study conducted by the Wisconsin Legislative Audit
Bureau arrived at similar conclusions."° Despite modest atten-
dance improvements among 16- and 17-year old Learnfare students,
overall the program had negative consequences on both attendance
and graduation rates. 7
In addition to having little impact on truancy, the program has
been troublesome to manage.'018 Anxiety has also surfaced
regarding the stress placed on school districts participating in the
Learnfare program."0 9 School staffs are required to complete
detailed attendance reports and participate in due process hearings,
both of which interfere with the classroom time of teachers.'
Furthermore, school administrators have determined that the
program is not increasing parental involvement in the educational
process."'
The realities of poverty have also contributed to the program's
failure. Most significantly, studies indicate that Learnfare's basic
assumptions ignore and oversimplify the historical context of
poverty.1 For example, over 40% of the families sanctioned
under Learnfare have been previously identified for abuse or
neglect or were families already involved in the juvenile court
105. See Jean Hopfensperger, Controversial Ideas in Welfare Bills Still Divide House &
Senate: States Using Them Have Mixed Results, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, Minn.), Mar.
28, 1995, at 01A.
106. Id.
107. See Mott, supra note 98, at Al (discussing the results of Wisconsin's experiment and
noting that a state audit found that the program costs $10.2 million to operate annually).
108. The University of Wisconsin's 1991 Learnfare evaluation revealed that the program's
complex administration requires individual judgement by hundreds of teachers and county
income maintenance workers. See Summary and Comment on Report on the Learnfare
Evaluation (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Jan. 1991) (on file with the Dickinson Law
Review).
109. See Racine County Withdraws from Learnfare, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Dec. 11, 1993, at 1D (describing the reasons why one Wisconsin county
withdrew from the program).
110. Id.
111. Paul Taylor, Welfare Policy's "New Paternalism" Uses Benefits To Alter Recipients
Behavior, WASH. POST, June 8, 1991, at A3. Two-thirds of Milwaukee school officials
concluded that Learmfare made no difference in attendance rates in their districts. In
addition, approximately 20% thought that the program contributed to increased family
tension. Id.




system. 13 Thus, the families penalized by Learnfare are among
the most dysfunctional in society. Reducing a family's basic
sustenance adds one more problem to an already emotionally and
financially stressed family.
2. Reactions to the Problematic Results. - Despite the
program's unconvincing results, Wisconsin has forged ahead with
similar behavior-modifying welfare reforms."1 4 Confident that the
multidimensional factors leading to poverty can be solved by
financial incentives, Wisconsin has enacted the most draconian
reform to date by proposing to eliminate the entire AFDC program
in Wisconsin by 1999."15
Despite Wisconsin's persistence, several states have decided
against implementing similar Learnfare programs.1 6 Neverthe-
less, some states march onward as the desire to reform welfare
intensifies.1 7 To date, Ohio, Maryland, Virginia, Oklahoma,
Missouri, and Florida have implemented programs that link welfare
benefits to school attendance.11 8 Pennsylvania is the most recent
state to submit a waiver application to the federal government
seeking permission to enact its Learnfare program. Despite
conceding in its federal waiver application that similar programs
113. As a result, a University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Employment and Training
Institute study found that only 28% of sanctioned students returned to school. State Can't
Force Teens To Learn, Halt Growth of Learnfare, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), June 24,
1993 (concluding that Leamfare's penalties have "reeked economic havoc on poor families").
114. See Some Voice Concern as Wisconsin Gets the OK To Test "Work Not Welfare,"
STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, Minn.), Nov. 3, 1993, at Al (announcing that the state has
enacted "Bridefare," a program that eliminates benefits for women who continue to have
children while on welfare and increases benefits to teenage mothers who marry).
115. On November 1, 1993, the Department of Health and Human Services waived
federal rules to allow Wisconsin to enact "Work, Not Welfare." The plan, which will be
tested in two counties in 1995 and potentially expanded statewide, will eliminate the AFDC
program entirely by 1999. Id.
116. While Leamfare was introduced in nearly half the state legislatures in 1992, the
program presently operates in only a handful of states. See Williams, supra note 5, at 746
(listing the states that have considered Learnfare). Not all states that have considered
Learnfare have decided to implement the program. For example, legislatures in Minnesota
and Georgia both have recently rejected the program. See House OKs Compromise Welfare
Bill, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, Minn.), May 11, 1995, at 02B; Carrie Teegardin,
Legislature '95 Changing Welfare, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 17, 1995, at H4.
117. See The Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at B1 (exploring the importance of
welfare reform nationwide in the November 1994 elections).




have produced mixed results, Pennsylvania intends to implement
Learnfare soon after federal approval is received." 9
IV. Welfare Reform in Pennsylvania
A. A National Leader in Welfare Reform
In the early 1980s, Pennsylvania became one of the first states
to address the failures of the welfare system. Act 75 of 1982 made
Pennsylvania one of the original states to reform its welfare system
in response to public skepticism over the effectiveness of the
existing scheme. 12 Governor Dick Thornburgh restructured the
Commonwealth's General Assistance program by cutting benefits
to 780,000 residents. 2' Severe limitations were also placed on
eligibility requirements for receiving benefits.22 The objective of
slashing General Assistance benefits was to "motivate" welfare
recipients to find work."2
The results of this reform were devastating. Nearly 90% of the
adults who were forced off the welfare rolls by Act 75 were unable
to secure permanent employment.' 24 As a result, the demand for
emergency shelter in Philadelphia doubled during the first year of
Act 75."z  In addition, throughout the Commonwealth, nearly
two-thirds of those who lost their welfare benefits were homeless
within one year. 26 The state legislature attempted to intervene
and ameliorate the harsh effects of Act 75.127 Governor Thorn-
burgh, however, vetoed the reforms."2 Rather than attempting
to address the institutional causes of poverty or truly reform the
119. Id. at 12 (outlining the timetable for the reform's implementation).
120. Whatever the Motivations, House Likely To Pass Welfare Cuts, PHILA. INQ., June 12,
1994, at Al.
121. See Phyllis Ryan, The Old Myths About Reforming Welfare Are Coming Back,




124. Id. The difficulty that Pennsylvanians forced off welfare rolls had finding secure jobs
is by no means unique. A recent study found 64% of the women nationwide coming on
welfare rolls for the first time leave within two years. However, more than 75% eventually
returned, and almost half returned within one year. See Jason DeParle, Welfare Mothers
Find Jobs Easy To Get But Hard To Hold, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1994, at Al.
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system, Thornburgh simply elected to create Pennsylvania's first
emergency shelter fund. 29
B. Pennsylvania's Learnfare Program
For several years after Thornburgh's failure to improve
Pennsylvania's welfare laws, the state made few attempts to revise
its failing welfare system. Ultimately, financial concerns13 ° and
political pressure13 t dictated the route to be followed. On July 15,
1994, Governor Robert P. Casey signed into law Act 49.132 The
legislation contains several provisions intended to reform Pennsyl-
vania's General Assistance 13 3 and AFDC programs."
1. Controversy from the Outset. - Despite Governor
Casey's initial reservations,) 5 the Act contains a punitive Learn-
fare experiment modeled after Wisconsin's program.1 36  The
inclusion of the school attendance provision was part of a compro-
mise to appease several members of the General Assembly who
129. Id.
130. State welfare programs cost $3.1 billion annually, approximately 22% of Pennsylva-
nia's $14 billion state budget. Taxpayers ultimately foot the bill. A resident with a taxable
income of $40,000 per year pays $250 annually in state taxes to support welfare programs.
Tim Reeves, Lines Form in Welfare Debate, PIrr. POST-GAZETTE, May 4, 1993, at B1.
131. See Robert Moran, Welfare Cuts Edge Closer to Reality, PHILA. INQ., June 9, 1994,
at B1 (describing the susceptibility of politicians to anti-welfare sentiment).
132. Act 49 amends the Act of June 13, 1967 (P.L. No. 21), known as the Pennsylvania
Public Welfare Code, by adding Sections 461 through 469.
133. The new law reduces the GA program by $88 million and restructures the $1.1
billion program by placing emphasis on ability to work, rather than on an individual's age.
The law also provides job training and job placement assistance for those able to work. See
1994 Pa. Laws 49.
134. In addition to the Learnfare experiment, Act 49 alters Pennsylvania's AFDC
program by establishing modest savings accounts for AFDC recipients and creating a pilot
program to reduce welfare fraud by finger-imaging recipients. Id.
135. See Casey Changes Course, the Governor Aligns Himself with the Welfare-Bashers,
PrIT. POST-GAZETrE, June 10, 1994, at C2 (noting Casey's initial apprehensions about
Learnfare).
136. Interestingly, while Pennsylvanians overwhelmingly support wide-ranging welfare
reforms, Learnfare is one of the least supported programs. Of eleven potential reforms, only
three programs received less public support than Learnfare's 58% approval. The least
supported alternatives were as follows: ending increases in benefits for additional children
born while the recipient is on welfare (55% support), subsidizing jobs in the private sector
as an alternative to welfare (53% support), and denying all welfare benefits to unmarried
teen mothers (44% support). See Henry A. Olsen, Hard Questions-Poll Finds Broad
Support for Welfare Reform, PATRIOT (Harrisburg, Pa.), Aug. 2, 1995, at A7.
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favored harsher provisions.137 While support for Act 49 was
generally bipartisan, the vote was distinctively split by geographic
category. All but one senator representing urban districts voted
against the Act, while only two legislators from rural or suburban
areas were opposed to enacting Learnfare.138
Despite specific efforts to remove Learnfare from Act 49, the
program remained intact after four hours of bitter debate.13 9
Originally, the reforms were intended to be implemented on July
9, 1994. However, litigation challenging the retroactivity1" and
the speed of implementing the reforms,141 as well as the approval
of federal waivers from the Department of Health and Human
Services delayed the implementation date.
2. The Program's Components. - The Pennsylvania
General Assembly determined that the existing welfare system fails
to provide an incentive to families receiving welfare to keep their
children in school until they receive a high school diploma.
1 42
Therefore, Pennsylvania reformed its welfare laws to hold families
responsible for their child's school attendance. The three-year pilot
program will test whether requiring regular school attendance as a
condition to receiving welfare payments ultimately increases the
employability and economic independence of AFDC recipients.
143
Pennsylvania's Learnfare experiment has two stated goals.1"
First, the program is intended to increase school attendance and the
graduation rate of AFDC-dependent children and teen age par-
ents.1 45 Second, Learnfare aims to open the doors to meaningful
job opportunities to impoverished students by increasing the
amount of education that they receive.1" Learnfare's underlying
assumption is that the imminent threat of a financial penalty will
137. See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 130, at 1 (explaining proposals to randomly drug test
AFDC recipients); Wanda Motley, Life on Endangered Benefits Barely Making It, Many
Welfare Recipients Fret About "Reform," PHILA. INQ., June 7, 1992, at B1 (describing
proposals to eliminate coverage for prescription drugs and nursing home care).
138. Moran, supra note 131, at B1 (analyzing the demographics of the Act 49 vote).
139. Reeves, supra note 130, at B1 (surveying the 30-19 senate vote to include Learnfare
in the welfare reform legislation).
140. Metropolitan Christian Coalition v. Snider, No. 94-CV-4611 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1994).
141. Lind v. Snider, No. 94-CV 4840 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 1994).
142. See 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 461(c) (1994).
143. Id. § 467.





persuade poor children to attend school and ultimately promote
economic independence. 47
If the federal waiver is granted, the program will be imple-
mented in seven diverse geographic areas throughout Pennsylva-
nia."4  Students from families receiving AFDC grants will be
randomly selected to participate in the experiment when their
families apply for AFDC eligibility.49 Once selected, a family
must remain in the program until the experiment is complete.' °
AFDC families not selected to participate in the experiment will
continue to receive public assistance under the program's existing
terms.15 The attendance and graduation rates of Learnfare and
non-Learnfare students will then be compared to determine
whether the financial penalty positively affected student attendance
and graduation rates. 52
Learnfare students will be required to attend school regularly
as a requirement of continued eligibility for AFDC benefits. 53
When the total absences for a Learnfare student exceed three
school days in any month, the County Board of Assistance will
notify the student and his or her family that an attendance problem
exists." If, after notification, the Learnfare student continues to
be excessively truant, the monthly AFDC allowance will be reduced
by $65 for each individual in the family unit who fails to meet
Learnfare's attendance requirements.
155
C. The Pending Federal Waiver Application
The Social Security Act allows states to experiment with their
AFDC programs by altering terms of the act. 56 Demonstration
projects enable states to seek innovative improvements in the
administration and provisions of the welfare system.'57 By allow-
ing states to experiment with existing welfare programs, the federal
government aspires to assist welfare recipients in achieving self-
147. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 463 (1994).
148. Id.
149. Id. § 467.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 467 (1994).
153. Id. § 466.
154. Id.
155. Id.




support and to strengthen family life.158 To obtain these goals,
the federal government may fund experimental programs and
match certain program costs to carry out approved projects.159
In September 1994, the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare
requested the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to
allow Pennsylvania to modify its existing AFDC program."6° The
Department is presently considering the application. 161 To imple-
ment the Learnfare program, several provisions of the Social
Security Act and the accompanying Federal Regulations must be
circumvented.
The federal government first must waive provisions in the
Social Security Act specifying that states must administer public
assistance programs on a statewide basis and treat all applicants
alike. 62 Learnfare also proposes to reduce AFDC grants for
those students enrolled in the program who fail to meet school
attendance requirements.' 63  Federal requirements, however,
specify that otherwise eligible children under the age of eighteen
may not be denied AFDC benefits on the basis of school atten-
dance or satisfactory course completion."6 Therefore, a federal
waiver has been requested to bypass this rule. Finally, a waiver is
required for a state to establish additional conditions of eligibility
to receive AFDC payments. 65 Thus, Pennsylvania needs federal
approval to require a parent or legal guardian to consent to the
release of school attendance records as a condition of eligibility for
AFDC benefits."6
V. Pennsylvania's Learnfare Experiment - The Prospects for
Success
State welfare experiments should seek new and innovative
improvements in the administration of public assistance. Pennsyl-
158. See King v. Smith, 342 U.S. 309 (1960) (declaring that the "paramount goal" of the
AFDC program is to strengthen the family).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1310(b)(1).
160. See Pennsylvania Waiver Application, supra note 11, at 8-9.
161. HHS has not established a timetable for announcing its decision whether to grant
waivers. Michael Wiseman, Welfare Reform in the States: The Bush Legacy, Focus, Spring
1993, at 23-25.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(1) (1988); 45 C.F.R. §§ 205.120, 233.10(a)(1)(iv) (1988).
163. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 466 (1994).
164. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(b).(1991).
165. Id. at § 233.10(a)(1)(ii)(B).
166. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 467 (1994).
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vania's Learnfare program, however, merely replicates a seven-
year-old Wisconsin program that has failed to produce positive
results. 1 67 While the program's goal of encouraging impoverished
students to obtain an education is commendable, evidence exists
that Learnfare is based on questionable premises."6
A. Tenuous Assumptions
Learnfare assumes that an AFDC student's habitual absentee-
ism contributes to chronic poverty.169 However, the attendance
habits of non-AFDC and AFDC students are nearly identical."7 '
Truancy, therefore, is not the primary cause of poverty.17
Instead, poverty is a function of many complex factors.
Learnfare also assumes that a family's indifference towards
education results in the impoverished student's failure to attend
school regularly.172  The program theorizes that education will
become a high priority when a family is threatened with financial
sanctions, and school attendance is directly linked to its basic
sustenance. However, studies reveal that welfare parents value
education as much, if not more, than middle class parents.173
Impoverished children who are chronically absent do not miss
school because of their parent's lack of concern. 74
167. For an overview of the similarities of the two programs, see Fact Sheet on Wisconsin
Learnfare, Summary and Comments of Report on the Learnfare Evaluation in Wisconsin, Jan.
1991 [hereinafter Wisconsin Fact Sheet] (on file with the Dickinson Law Review).
168. See Williams, supra note 5, at 746 (exploring the underlying assumptions of
Learnfare); Timothy Casey, What's Wrong with Workfare and Learnfare, 1 GEO. J. ON
FIGHTING POVERTY 116 (1993).
169. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 461 (1994).
170. On average, AFDC students attend school 169 days a year, while non-AFDC
students attend for 172 days. See WILLIAM MCMAHON ET AL., DO SCHOOL ATTENDANCE
RATES VARY BETWEEN AFDC AND NON-AFDC SUPPORTED CHILDREN? 3 (The Urban
Research Center, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 1989).
171. In fact, while the number of children living in poverty is at a record high, the
dropout rate is dramatically declining. See Williams, supra note 5, at 727 (reporting that the
percentage of African-Americans, for example, who have not completed high school has
dropped from 60% in 1960 to 17% in 1985).
172. See 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 461 (1994) (noting that a problem with present
welfare policy is that families are not responsible for their children's educational attainment).
173. See FAY LOMAX COOK, CONVERGENT PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL WELFARE
POLICY: THE VIEWS FROM THE GENERAL PUBLIC, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, AND AFDC
RECIPIENTS 5-55 (Center For Urban Affairs and Policy Research, Northwestern Univ., 1988)
(reporting that over 80% of welfare mothers believed education was essential for their
children's escape from poverty).
174. For a thoughtful look at some of the reasons poverty-stricken children miss school,
see Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency" from a Different Ground,
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B. Lessons Learned from Existing Learnfare Programs
While several states have enacted some type of Learnfare
program, only the Wisconsin and Ohio programs have been in
effect long enough to produce meaningful results.'75 A multi-year
evaluation of Wisconsin's Learnfare program has found that AFDC
teenagers did not demonstrate improved attendance or graduation
rates under the experiment.'76 The Ohio demonstration, in con-
trast, has marginally increased school retention rates among
teenagers and induced some dropouts to return to school. 77
The difference in success can be ascribed to the distinct
approaches taken by the two states to encourage school attendance.
Unfortunately, Pennsylvania's approach combines several of the
ineffective aspects of the Wisconsin program while simultaneously
failing to incorporate the successful elements of the Ohio program.
Thus, while Pennsylvania's program identifies the problem of
truancy, it does little to address meaningful causes of chronic
absenteeism.t7
1. The Importance of a Narrowly Tailored Plan. - Most
Learnfare experiments target specific student populations and focus
on a particular group's special needs.79 For example, Ohio's
statewide Learnfare program applies solely to teenage parents on
welfare."m Although this segment accounts for only 8% of Ohio's
welfare population, teenage parents are an especially vulnerable
group that must be encouraged to attend school while they are
young.'
81
81 GEO. L.J. 1961 (1993).
175. See, e.g., Pennsylvania's Waiver Application, supra note 11, at 1 (surveying the
implementation dates of various programs: Virginia (1992), Maryland (1993), Missouri
(1994), and Florida (1995)).
176. Wisconsin Fact Sheet, supra note 167, at 2.
177. See Susan Chira, Teenage Mothers Helped by Ohio Plan, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1994, at A16 (combining social services with financial incentives and deterrents
persuaded 5.6% more mothers to graduate from high school).
178. Id. (noting that Ohio's program offers social services to address the underlying
causes of poverty).
179. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Waiver Application, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that Virginia's
Learnfare program targets AFDC children in grades six through twelve, while Missouri,
Oklahoma, and Florida's experiments are applicable only to teenagers).
180. See Spencer Rich, Welfare Bonus Seen Keeping Moms in Class, WASH. POST, Apr.
12, 1993, at A9 (examining Ohio's Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP) program).




In contrast, both the Pennsylvania and Wisconsin experiments
are exceedingly broad. In fact, the Pennsylvania program is even
applicable to students who are outside the scope of the state's
compulsory education requirements. 182  The program assumes
that first graders and high school seniors will be motivated by the
same financial incentives. Moreover, it presupposes that mothers
will be able to exercise control over their eighteen-year-old
children, when, in reality, they may be outside the sphere of their
parents' control.
2. The Significance of Social Services. - The presence of
support services also distinguishes Ohio's program from the
approach taken by Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.1"' The success
of Learnfare programs may directly relate to the intensity and
effectiveness of social services utilized to encourage students to
attend school.184 Ohio's experiment, for instance, is built around
intensive support services. The first contact students have with
Ohio's Learnfare program is a required personal assessment
interview at the time they are determined to be eligible for the
program. 85 This is important because impoverished students are
often isolated, and developing positive relationships with school
figures is essential.8 6  This initial contact sets the tone for suc-
cessful participation in the program.
Pennsylvania's plan does not incorporate this constructive
initial contact into its program. Rather, Pennsylvania utilizes a
lottery approach to determine which poor families will have
restrictive conditions placed upon their welfare benefits."8
Children on welfare are already stigmatized. Learnfare ostracizes
these students further by requiring school officials to single them
out for identification and monitoring. To further alienate these
182. Compare 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 464 (1994) (Learnfare applies to individuals
eight through eighteen years of age) with Pennsylvania's Compulsory Education Statute, 22
PA. CODE §§ 1326-1327 (1949) (requiring students aged eight through seventeen to attend
school). See generally Marc Stuart Gerber, Equal Protection Public Choice Theory, and
Learnfare: Wealth Classification Revisited, 81 GEO. L.J. 2141 (1993) (discussing possible
violations of the Equal Protection Clause by treating welfare recipients differently).
183. See Chira, supra note 177 and accompanying text (differentiating Ohio's program).
184. Id.
185. See Manpower Development Research Corp's Ohio LEAP Fact Sheet, Apr. 12, 1993,
at 3 [hereinafter Ohio Fact Sheet] (on file with the Dickinson Law Review).
186. See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text discussing Virginia's Learnfare
program and the importance of making school more attractive to poor students.
187. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 467 (1994).
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students, similar conditions are not necessarily attached to their
neighbors and classmates in the same financial distress who miss
school.
In addition, it is noteworthy that Ohio assigns each Learnfare
participant a case manager to work closely with the student to
decrease the barriers to regular school attendance. 18 8  Ohio's
Learnfare students also participate in annual reassessment inter-
views." 9 Moreover, the Ohio model includes complete child care
and transportation assistance' 90 Teenagers also receive assistance
with locating summer jobs, and their wages are disregarded in
calculating their welfare eligibility.191
The success of Ohio's Learnfare has been attributed to the
unique personal involvement and support of social workers. While
the program has shown promise, still only 21% of all AFDC
parents in the program graduate from high school t 92 The Ohio
Department of Welfare has determined that the most effective
antidote to this meager graduation rate is to make school more
attractive to poverty-stricken students.' 93 Many indigent students
do not attend school because they fear for their safety.194 In
addition, a considerable amount of Learnfare students drop out of
school because they believe that they are poorly treated by teachers
and students since they are teen parents.195 Making school more
attractive is an essential ingredient to encourage students to remain
in school. Yet, instead of encouraging poverty-stricken teens to
attend school for its educational benefits, Pennsylvania has opted
to induce these students into the classroom exclusively by threaten-
ing to remove their family's financial safety net.
3. Rewarding Positive Behavior. - Financial incentives
also differentiate Ohio's program from Pennsylvania's model. Ohio
offers financial incentives in addition to the monetary penalties for
poor attendance.1 96 In contrast, the approach taken by Pennsyl-
188. See Ohio Fact Sheet, supra note 185, at 1.
189. Id. at 3.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Chira, supra note 177, at A16.
193. Id.
194. Ruth Conniff, Blaming the Welfare Poor, BALT. SUN, Jan. 15, 1992, at All.
195. Id.
196. LEAP students who do not have more than four total absences or more than two
unexcused absences receive a $62 bonus payment. See Ohio Fact Sheet, supra note 185, at
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vania and Wisconsin is strictly punitive. The sole inducement to
attend school for Learnfare students in Pennsylvania is the threat
of losing a portion of their family's welfare benefits. Students who
regularly attend school are not affected by the program. Ohio,
however, offers financial bonuses to students who consistently
attend class.'97 Ohio recognizes positive behavior and financially
rewards students for making a commitment to education.
A prime example of recognizing positive behavior is Virginia's
Learnfare program.198  Virginia's experiment, which targets
middle school students, rewards children who regularly attend
school with movie tickets and fast food meals.1'9 In addition, the
experiment provides students who are struggling academically with
free tutorial services.2"
The purely punitive approach has failed to substantially alter
attendance habits in Wisconsin. Moreover, it sends an improper
moral message about the value of school. Pennsylvania's Learnfare
attempts to induce poor children to attend school to avoid financial
penalties. Instead, Pennsylvania should also encourage indigent
students to attend school because it is beneficial and will best
enable them to escape poverty.
C. Precarious Incentives of Pennsylvania's Learnfare Program
Learnfare creates improper incentives that undermine the
desirability of the program. If the premise of the experiment is
accurate and students are prompted by money to attend school, no
motivation exists for a student who has missed three days of class
in one month to attend school for the duration of the month. The
program's all-or-nothing approach leaves a student who has missed
three full days of school in one month in the same financial straits
as a student who misses school every day for the entire month.
In addition, while Learnfare penalizes the impoverished
student who fails to regularly attend class, 0 1 the program does
not penalize truly disruptive or violent students. Curiously,
1.
197. Id. at 3.
198. See Olivia Winslow, Effectiveness of Welfare Reform Questioned - Idea That Drew




201. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 466 (1994).
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students who are expelled and unable to find a school that will
accept them are exempt from Learnfare's penalties. 2 Therefore,
a student who is motivated by money, but has no desire to attend
school, has a strong incentive to misbehave and be expelled from
school without fear of losing the family's welfare money.
D. Inconsistencies Between Learnfare and the Goals of Welfare
Reform
Welfare aims to develop programs that strengthen family
life.203 President Clinton has repeatedly echoed the need to
reinforce the family unit.2" The recent enactments of the Family
Leave Act,20 5 attempts to create a national database to target
deadbeat fathers,2° and efforts to establish paternity in the
delivery room 20 7 indicate President Clinton's desire to center his
domestic policy around the family. Learnfare may be harmful to
the family unit, another obstacle to the experiment's ultimate
success.
1. Reforming Welfare to Strengthen the Family. - The
Supreme Court has declared that the "paramount goal" of the
AFDC program is to enhance family life.208 Therefore, strength-
ening the family and reforming the welfare system are intimately
intertwined.2 9  As welfare rolls increase at a record pace, it is no
coincidence that the portrait of the American family continues to
change.21 Over half the live births in the United States today are
202. Id.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1988).
204. See, e.g., Chuck Myers, In Their Own Words, PHILA. INO., Oct. 11, 1992, at E4
(quoting President Clinton extensively on his beliefs regarding the American family).
205. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
206. See Roger J.R. Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat" Dads: The Problem with the
Direction of Welfare Reform, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1 (1994) (detailing fathers'
support obligations in the context of welfare reform).
207. See Ron Suskind, Clinton Unveils Welfare Reform, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1995, at
A2 (outlining child support enforcement reforms).
208. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 315 (1968).
209. States are cognizant of this connection. For example, the main objective of
Michigan's welfare reform - "Strengthening Michigan's Families" - is to encourage families
to remain together in order to create economic and emotional stability. See Michigan's
§ 1115 Federal Waiver Application (submitted Aug. 7, 1992) (on file with the Dickinson Law
Review).
210. Douglas J. Besharova, Working To Make Welfare a Chore, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9,
1994. The present number of illegitimate births among African-Americans now account for
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out of wedlock.21' Illegitimate births signify the deterioration of
the family unit and are a significant reason why half the families
receiving public assistance are presently headed by women.212
Instead of improving family life, Learnfare creates debilitating
consequences for the family. For instance, the program gives a
deviant child power over an entire family. In middle class families,
parents have the ability and authority to withhold allowance money
in response to a child's improper behavior. Yet, under the terms
of Learnfare, the rebellious child has the power in an impoverished
family to control the family's finances. Empowering poor children
with the ability to manipulate their family's financial safety net has
irrational effects on the household.
2. The Dynamics of Poverty. - Pennsylvania's Learnfare
fails to consider the realities of the impoverished family. Learnfare
attempts to change a child's behavior through a daily allowance of
approximately $2.00. The causes of an indigent student's truancy
are typically more complex than Learnfare assumes.213 Ordinari-
ly, missing school is only one aspect of an underlying crisis.
The preliminary results of Maryland's Learnfare program
illustrate this point.214 The Maryland experiment sanctioned
approximately 10% of the program's students during the program's
inaugural year.21 5 This number exceeded what the program's
directors anticipated. As a result, the sanctioned students and their
families were interviewed in order to better understand the reasons
for their irregular attendance. 216  The sanctioned families were
frequently the most troubled families in the program.217 These
families were often involved in the court system for abuse or
nearly 70% of all births. Robert J. Samuelson, Welfare Can't Be Reformed, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 27, 1995.
211. See generally Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 42 DUKE
L.J. 274, 280-81 (1991) (discussing the structure of the American family).
212. See WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 26-27 (1987) (analyzing the
connection between poverty and female-headed households).
213. See Williams, supra note 5, at 746 (explaining how Learnfare "diverts attention from
the structural problems of society and focuses on the so-called deviance of the poor").
214. See Sandra Evans, Md. and Va. Take Different Tracks on Welfare Program, WASH.
POST, July 21, 1993, at D3 (describing Primary Prevention Initiative, Maryland's approach
to keeping welfare recipients in school).
215. See Laura Lippman, Many Welfare Mothers Getting Smaller Check, BALT. SUN, Mar.





neglect while the student was truant. Thus, the student's irregular
attendance was an enormously complex issue. Withholding the
family's basic sustenance adds enormous pressure to an already
volatile situation.
VI. Conclusion
States have driven the nation's welfare agenda for over a
decade. Through the use of federal waivers, the states have
enacted a plethora of welfare experiments. Despite the wide
latitude that the federal government has provided the states with
which to experiment, little improvement has been made in the
welfare system. The number of welfare recipients and the costs of
administering the program continue to increase at a staggering
pace.
Congress is presently debating welfare reform that will funda-
mentally change the existing system. Both Congress' and the
Clinton administration's reforms provide greater autonomy to the
states. Thus, it appears likely that Pennsylvania will ultimately be
permitted to enact its Learnfare experiment by virtue of a federal
waiver or by utilizing its own discretion under a block grant
scheme.
Pennsylvania may no longer be able to rely on federal
programs and regulations to provide its citizens with a financial
safety net. Pennsylvania lawmakers will have to answer the
difficult question that has been answered almost exclusively in
Washington for the past 60 years: which low income residents are
deserving of public support. In resolving this issue, Pennsylvania
lawmakers should be cognizant of Governor Tom Ridge's directive
that welfare reform should "unite[] compassion with common
sense."
218
Pennsylvania's Learnfare program essentially duplicates a
Wisconsin experiment that has not achieved its goals. No indica-
tion exists that a broad punitive Learnfare program in Pennsylvania
will increase school attendance or graduation rates, strengthen
family life, or brighten the life prospects for poverty-stricken
students. In fact, while welfare reform should focus on saving
people and not money, no evidence even exists that Learnfare
ultimately will decrease the cost of administering public welfare.
218. Pennsylvania Governor Ridge Signs Welfare Reform Bill, PR. NEWSWIRE, June 30,
1995.
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Instead, Learnfare will likely hurt the same families it alleges
to help by removing the financial safety net without addressing the
structural problems that induce chronic poverty. As a result,
Pennsylvania should reconsider implementing its Learnfare experi-
ment. While the goals of the program are desirable, the method
selected to improve attendance and graduation rates and the
ultimate employability of the poorest children is unproven. Equally
important, the consequences may be dangerous.
Michael K. Gottlieb

